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Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Regulations - Money Transfer
Reports
Gregory J. Cook, EA, CPA
Currency Exchange Record
Each currency exchanger must create and maintain a record of each exchange of
currency in excess of $1,000. The currency exchange may be either domestic or
foreign currency, or it may be both. Thus, a currency exchange record is
required when:
*Currency-in
greater than $1,000, or
*Currency-out
greater than $1,000.
Example. A customer wishes to exchange $3,000 in Canadian dollars for its
equivalent in U.S. dollars, or a customer wishes to exchange $1,500 in $20 bills
for $1,500 in $100 bills.
In each case, the transaction must be recorded.
The requirement to record currency exchanges includes the following – the
currency exchanger must:
*Record
customer ID and information,
*Record
transaction information,
*Retain
the record for five years from the date of the transaction.
Reports That Can Help MSBs Identify Suspicious Transactions
The following list of reports can be used to look for possible money laundering
activity in MSBs.
Cash-In and Cash-Out of Large Transaction Reports
Many MSBs prepare, or have systems that generate, reports of cash-in and
cash-out. Often these reports include transactions that exceed a certain
threshold. Many money transmitters, for example, have established identification
requirements at levels below the $3,000 threshold. Such reports can help
identify customers who may be structuring transactions to evade BSA reporting
and recordkeeping requirements or who are engaging in other unusual activity.
Kiting Reports
Issuers of traveler’s checks and money orders and money transfer companies often
prepare, or have systems that generate, reports that identify transactions that
may involve kiting. Kiting is depositing and drawing checks between accounts at
two or more banks and thereby taking advantage of the float – that is, the time
it takes the bank of deposit to collect from the paying bank. Reports that
indicate kiting may also disclose other unusual patterns of activity possibly
associated with money laundering.
Money Transfer Reports
Money transfer companies prepare, or have systems that generate, daily
transaction reports and other reports that identify different groupings of
transfer activity processed through their systems (e.g., corridor reports
showing all transfers from country A to country B in a specific time period).
These reports can help identify unusual patterns that may suggest possible money
laundering.
Depending on the type of report and the frequency, these reports can help
identify unusual customer behavior. Such reports also may help identify unusual
behavior of businesses serving as agents of money transfer companies.
$3,000 Instrument “Log”
Reports of cash sales of instruments between $3,000 - $10,000, inclusive,
required by BSA regulations, can help MSBs identify possible currency
structuring patterns. Recorded information can, for example, help identify
customers who may be structuring transactions to evade the BSA reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
Clearance Records/Receipts
Issuers of money orders and traveler’s checks prepare, or have systems that
generate, daily records of items that have been presented for payment against
the issuer’s bank account. Many issuers have designed programs to identify
unusual patterns of cleared instruments. Such reports can be extremely useful in
the identification of items that may have been used for illicit purposes.
$3,000 Funds Transfer Records
These records, required by BSA regulations, can help money transmitters identify
possible structuring patterns. Records of $3,000 or more in money transfers
regardless of the method of payment may help identify customers who could be
structuring transactions to evade BSA reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Customer Activity Reports
Some MSBs use customer reward programs to encourage repeat use by customers.
Reports generated to monitor individual customer responses or general customer
activity can be useful in identifying unusual transactions or patterns of
transactions.
Some Money Laundering Schemes
The following descriptions are intended to help MSBs identify activities that
criminals use to launder money. They are also intended to reinforce the need for
strict customer identification programs. Finally, although these examples are of
landmark investigations that primarily involve banks, they provide lessons to be
learned by MSBs as well.
Operation Polar Cap
Two banks reported suspicious activities related to changes in operations by
customers. Those two reports and an analysis of CTRs by the U.S. Customs Service
helped bring together a national investigation.
At one bank, an employee noticed that a customer, a jewelry broker, was making
large cash deposits ($25 million over three months) that did not seem
commensurate with his usual business. In addition to filing the CTRs required
for cash transactions by this customer of more than $10,000 in a business day,
one bank also notified the IRS Criminal Investigation Division (IRS-CID).
At the other bank, an observant employee became suspicious when a customer, who
ran a grocery store and check cashing service, stopped taking cash back for the
checks he deposited in the bank. This change led the banker to notify law
enforcement authorities.
Together, these two suspicious banks helped uncover and disrupt an operation
that had laundered about $1.2 billion over two years. More than 127 people were
arrested, a foreign bank was indicted, and one ton of cocaine was seized.
Numerous convictions resulted.
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| Operation C-Chase |
A Luxembourg-based bank, two of its subsidiaries, nine bank officials, and 75
other individuals in several countries were indicted for possible involvement in
a worldwide money laundering scheme. Convictions were obtained in a significant
number of cases. The operation relied on the launderers’ associates picking up
cash from drug activities in cities around the United States and, either through
funds transfers or by physically transporting the cash, depositing it into
undercover accounts in a U.S. bank.
The associates signed blank checks drawn on the undercover accounts, and after a
cash pickup occurred, the head of the laundering operation would enter the
amount onto one of the blank checks and forward it to the owner of the funds or
sell it on the currency black market.
As the operation expanded, the head of the operation developed several variants
on that process. Some funds from the undercover accounts were wired to similar
accounts in a Central American bank to further disguise their origin. Others
were transferred through another U.S. bank to a foreign bank.
In both instances, the funds transferred to the foreign bank were placed in
90-day certificates of deposit and used as collateral on loans made by the
Central American bank to its associates. The loan proceeds were then deposited
in undercover accounts in the bank and forwarded through the chain as before.
At a later date, funds wired through two foreign banks were used to purchase
certificates of deposit at a second foreign bank. The certificates were then
used as collateral on loans made at a third foreign bank, the proceeds of which
were wired back to the undercover accounts at the U.S. banks, and transferred
from there to the owner’s account in South America. The organizers of this ring
were careful to warn participants that transactions should be handled in varying
combinations to avoid developing a pattern. They used many legitimate
businesses, such as hotels and restaurants, to originate funds transfers to the
undercover accounts. Together, the network was able to absorb about $10 million
per month in drug proceeds. |
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| Note |
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On October 3, 2007 I attended the
Practitioners Council Liaison Meeting at the Internal Revenue Service's
Birmingham, Alabama office. One of the IRS speakers at this meeting was Susan
Vega, Bank Secrecy Act Expert. I found the information Mrs. Vega presented to be
very interesting and informative and decided to dedicate several pages of our
website to it. |
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